George  E.  Buker

THE  PENOBSCOT  EXPEDITION:
COMMODORE  SALTONSTALL
AND THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSPIRACY OF 1779


Annapolis. Naval Institute Press. 2002. 204 pp.

ISBN 1557502129

reviewed by Patrick Killough




(1) biblio.com  not available for review 09/26/2010

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(2) lunch.com

name of review:  USA beaten by "the technological limitations of square-rigged ships in restricted waters"

rating:  * * * *

review:

Four years into the American Revolution, on May 30, 1779, British Brigadier General Francis McLean sailed from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to build a fort on Penobscot Bay in Maine (then still part of Massachusetts). He brought with him nearly 700 Scottish troops in six transports, escorted by a frigate of 32 guns, 3 lighter-armed sloops and a brig. He landed on the Bagaduce peninsula, east of the Penobscot River leading up to Bangor and west of the small but deep Bagaduce River. Sailing on the entire bay area is heavily determined by winds and tides and narrowness of rock-strewn waterways.
 
Days later the Boston-based government of Massachusetts learned of McLean's landing and determined to oust him in his efforts to rally British loyalists and harass American shipping from a secure new base. In retrospect, it is clear that once McLean completed work on his new Fort George, he could hold out against vastly superior American ground forces, given Britain's dominance of the American sea coast by warships based on Manhattan. If the Americans were to win, and victory seemed likely, they would have to attack boldly and non-stop and win fast.
 
In July and August 1779 the largest combined land-sea action to date by Americans was laying siege to Fort George. The fort was so little advanced, with its walls barely above knee level, that a determined charge by the 1,000-plus American militia at any time in the first week would have forced surrender.
 
General McLean was even standing at his flagstaff during one broken off attack prepared to strike his colors rather than waste his men in a hopeless cause. But the ill-trained, understaffed ground forces, commanded by Massachusetts militia Brigadier General Solomon Lovell, a prominent politician, lost their nerve and also opportunity after opportunity to take the fort.

As time passed, Lovell repeatedly decided that he could not take the fort until after the independently commanded American flotilla had first destroyed or captured the three warships and three troop carriers that the British had anchored in a row at a narrow place on the Bagaduce River just south of the peninsula.
 
Commanding, with the title of Commodore, the American assortment of ships (Continental, Massachusetts government and for-profit privateers) was Captain Dudley Saltonstall, an experienced officer of the Continental navy. The American attacking ships, numbering 18, were a motley lot and had never trained or exercised together. They were in no sense a unified fleet.
 
In Saltonstall's consistent judgment, the British defensive alignment was perfect. The Americans had to attack one at a time in a straight line. The British were at right angles firing broadsides. In addition, heavy guns from Fort George would also hole the American ships. Saltonstall had no doubt that he could take or destroy the British ships, but at too heavy a price, and the main goal, Fort George, would still be as strong as ever, with the British sailors all retreating to the fort to augment the defenders. So Saltonstall made his crack marines available to General Lovell to encourage him to attack, and every land success the Americans had was due to the marines.
 
Neither Saltonstall nor Lovell was able to convince the other to attack the foe before them head on and end things. As every day passed, Bigadier McLean and his Scots built their ramparts higher and higher, ever harder to crack. The American commanders dithered so long that a British relief fleet with bigger guns easily bottled up the Americans. Almost all the American personnel, both soldiers and sailors, managed to escape safely back home, but only after all their troop carriers and warships had been captured or burned.
 
Legendary hero Paul Revere was part of the Penobsot Expedition, in charge of militia artillery. He was later unsuccessfully court-martialed on a number of charges, including disobedience and behavior verging on cowardice. A subsequent board of inquiry by Massachusetts government (including no naval men) effectively whitewashed the Massachusetts land forces from blame for the disastrous Penobscot Expedition while placing sole responsibility upon Commodore Saltonstall, who was not a Massachusetts man. This became the official view of history until preparations for the bicentennial of the battle in 1979 caused a number of scholars to review the evidence.
 
Author George E. Buker, an ex-Navy man himself, concludes in THE PENOBSOT EXPEDITION: COMMODORE SALTONSTALL AND THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSPIRACY OF 1779 that the waters of Penobscot Bay were virtually impossible for large square-rigged vessels to maneuver in (the defensively arrayed British warships were anchored and stationary.) Commodore Saltonstall's appraisal was therefore, in Buker's opinion, essentially correct. The winds along the Maine coast blew predominantly from the west. Once up the Bagaduce river after defeating the enemy, the large American square-rigged warships would have to fight the wind through endless tacking and/or drift back west to safety with an ebb tide, being continually in range of guns from Fort George, perched 200 feet higher.
 
In Buker's view, the landlubbers rendering after the fact  judgment in Boston had no clue about "the technological limitations of square-rigged ships in restricted waters."
 
They never took testimony from Commodore Saltonstall and simply accepted General Lovell's self-serving view of things. According to author Buker, the general lied repeatedly. But Buker in his book has finally set things straight!
 
Nonetheless, at the time, the "Massachusetts Conspiracy" or cover-up of unpleasant facts about Massachusetts militia and their leader worked well. For Congress ultimately accepted the view that defeat was the navy's fault, and the flotilla in Penobscot Bay had been led by a Continental officer. Result: in 1793 Congress reimbursed Massachusetts $1,248,000.
 
In 2010 novelist Bernard Cornwell retold the story of the Penobscot Expedition in THE FORT: A NOVEL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. He drew heavily  on Buker's THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION. For an interested but not technically expert  reader, neither book makes perfect sense without the other. Neither offers very detailed or useful maps. Buker is dry and sketchy. Cornwell is lively and fleshes out the leading characters with very little fiction -- for an historical novel.
 
Both books read together make me personally determined to get back to Maine in the summer of 2011 and walk the battlefields for myself.

-OOO-http://www.lunch.com/Reviews/d/george_e_buker_
the_penobscot_expedition_commodore_saltonstall_and_
the_massachusetts_conspiracy_of_1779-1625846.html

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(3) bn.com  NOTE: THIS REVIEW WAS PREMATURELY AND ACCIDENTALLY SENT UP TO BN.COM. I CAN DISCOVER NO MECHANISM TO EDIT IT! So it will just have to stand.

title of review: "I am not going to risk my shipping in that damned hole."

rating: * * * *

title of review: "I am not going to risk my shipping in that damned hole."

rating: * * * *

review:

On July 26, militia captain John Brewer, who had been in the still weak Fort George only days before told Commodore Saltonstall that the American warships could sail right up to the anchored British ships, land more troops "under cover of his own guns, and in half an hour make everything his own. In reply to which he hove up his long chin, and said

'You seem to be damn knowing about the whole matter! I am not going to risk my shipping in that damn hole.'" (Ch. 3)

In author Buker's view, any good sailor would know that with a strong west wind (as prevailed along the Maine coast) and with more cannons, sailing eastward in and through the British ships was feasible. But getting back out in the teeth of the wind, even with an ebb tide, would be a very slow process, with Saltonstall's ships constantly exposed to fire from Fort George, elevated 200 feet above sea level.

recommended reading:

-- Sir Walter Scott - THE PIRATE

-- James Fenimore Cooper - THE PILOT, The History of the Navy of the United States of America

-- Bernard Cornwell - THE FORT

http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-Penobscot-Expedition/
George-E-E-Buker/e/9781557502124/?itm=1&USRI=george+e.+buke
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(4) amazon.com 09/26/2010

title of review: "I was one of the many who had never heard of that battle."

rating: *** 1/2

review:


THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION: COMMODORE SALTONSTALL AND THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSPIRACY OF 1779 is a work of serious historical intent. In his Preface, author George E. Buker, however, candidly admits that when asked in 1996 to lecture about the subject of the book that emerged 14 years later -- the military and naval engagements of July-August 1779, "I was one of the many who had never heard of that battle." But he then redeemed himself by spending the next four years researching and lecturing about the Penobscot Expedition.

At the end of his research, he decided that over two hundred years earlier a Massachusetts State Board of Inquiry had badly botched assigning blame for the greatest American naval disaster before Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Prevailing wisdom was that the Massachusetts militia under Brigadier General Solomon Lovell had fought well and would have expelled the British from their hastily built Fort George, except for one thing. That thing was the refusal of the independent co-commander of the naval forces of 18 American warships, ship Captain also simultaneously fleet Commodore Dudley Saltonstall, to destroy the six British ships anchored in a narrow passage opposing his approach to Fort George.

The failure of the two American commanders to act promptly allowed a British relief squadron from New York to come up and destroy or capture every single American vessel.

Author George E. Buker has two purposes for THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION:

(1) to prove that Militia General Lovell lied successfully in his testimony to the Board of Inquiry

and

(2) to demonstrate that Commodore Saltonstall had better reasons for his caution than any landlubbers could ever understand. In my opinion, Buker makes both cases rather well.

Most of his argumentation is about the limitations of large square-rigged vessels sailing in the restricted, rocky dangerous waters of Penobscot Bay. The wind is almost always from the west. To defeat the enemy vessels, the Americans must sail, one by one, directly eastward and into the broadsides of three British warships heavily supported by cannons from Fort George. Saltonstall judged that his forces could destroy the British ships, but taking unacceptably heavy punishment from the cannons of both ships and fort.

And once inside the British naval defenses, then what?

The Americans could not just turn around and quickly sail out again. The west wind was against them. They would either have to tack for two or three hours or wait for an ebb tide to float them slowly out of range of the fort's guns. No way!

Anyway, the Commodore reasoned, if I destroy the enemy warships, the fort remains untouched. Let General Lovell make use of the hundreds of marines I will lend him to storm the fort. If the fort falls, the warships must surrender.

And so it went. Lovell would not attack Fort George before Saltonstall had defeated the British warships. And Saltonstall would not attack the ships till Lovell had taken the fort.

As Buker meticulously and laboriously makes his case in favor of Commodore Saltonstall, we readers are drawn along in his wake, learning much sea lore and seamanship in the process. We learn that an attacking ship will not go near another wooden ship that is on fire. Fire spreads easily and nearby ships will explode or go up in flames when fire reaches their magazines. Square-rigged sailing vessels maneuver well when the wind is directly behind them. But they become turtles when sailing into the wind. Elaborate charts make details clear about ships' speed when tacking and when moving with or against tides.

In the end, Saltonstall, for all his caution lost every ship in his fleet except one or two that escaped. He was no Nelson, no Bull Halsey. As soon as the British warships that the Commodore would not attack were free to do so, they joined the fleet from New York in chasing the Americans in a panic flight up the Penobscot River toward Bangor. Saltonstall had good, sound naval reasons for doing so little, but he gambled and lost. Meanwhile the Massachusetts militia escaped blame in Massachusetts. And even the U.S. Congress agreed that the navy under Commodore Saltonstall bore all the blame.

This book makes a couple of simple points. The writing is not inspired, although clear, at least as to naval practice. It is a somewhat better than average book. I rate it 3.5 points, rounding up to 4. Once you have read Buker, turn to the better written, more three-dimensional novel, THE FORT, by Bernard Cornwell. That novel, drawing heavily on Buker's pioneering research, is more lightly fictionalized than most historical novels. It has a better map of Penobscot Bay and the author clarifies what the British and American land and naval commanders were trying to do.

-OOO-

tags: george e. buker, dudley saltonstall, solomon lovell, francis mclean, fort george, penobscot bay, bernard cornwell


http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1557502129/
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(5) epinions.com  SAP requested 09/24/2010

Review Title:  Why 18  American warships were (briefly) wise not to attack three British warships

Product Rating: * * * *

Pros: Everything you ever wanted to know about square-rigged vessels fighting in cramped quarters.

Cons: Flat writing. Imperfect Index. Two-dimensional historical characters. Rather angry arguing for a thesis.

The Bottom Line: Good if you are keen on Revolutionary War history, battle tactics on land and water and a great American military and naval defeat. Endure dull writing and a tiny map.


aohcapablanca's Full Review: George E. Buker - The Penobscot Expedition

When reading the next book that I plan to review, THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE REVISITED, I was struck by something said by Hubert H. Harrison, Caribbean-born professional critic resident in Harlem. A book reviewer's job is to "explain the purpose of the author, [and] tell whether he attains it."

This is a relatively straightforward recommendation. I shall try to comply in reviewing George E. Buker's scholarly historical study - THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION: COMMODORE SALTONSTALL AND THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSPIRACY OF 1779.

     First, what is Buker's purpose in writing THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION?

-- To present the facts of armed conflict by sea and land between late May and late August 1779. Geographic focus is the Down East coast of Massachusetts (now Maine) and a small peninsula just east of the mouth of the Penobscot River, miles downstream from the then tiny settlement of Bangor at the head of navigation.

-- To correct a two-centuries old misreading of those facts (at their core is the greatest American naval debacle before Pearl Harbor in 1941).

-- In particular, to clear from blame for  the loss of two score American rebel vessels to the British, the American naval Commander/Commodore, Continental navy captain Dudley Saltonstall. To do this, Buker has to shift guilt to Brigadier General Solomon Lovell, commanding the State of Massachusetts ground force of understaffed, sometimes decrepit militiamen.

The naval and land forces were independently led by the two commanders, who were merely ordered to co-operate.

     Second, does George Buker attain his two-part aim?

Let me note in passing that I have  recently reviewed another fictional treatment of the same Penobscot Expedition of 1779: THE FORT: A NOVEL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR (2010) by Bernard Cornwell.  

Cornwell imaginatively draws on the rather dry, argumentative presentation of Buker and thereby inspired me to have a look at what had inspired Cornwell. 

At the end of the day, I think that Buker makes his case that Commodore Saltonstall was not solely to blame for the Penobscot Bay debacle. But there is still room to argue. Novelist Bernard Cornwell covers the same ground, gets inside the heads of the British and American commanders by land and by sea and comes down with plenty of blame to spread all over the Americans.

In an oversimplified nutshell, the ground commander, Brigadier General Lovell would not assault British Fort George before Commodore Saltonstall sank or captured the small British force anchored in a narrow spot opposing the Americans. Conversely, Saltonstall would not sail against the British warships until after the Massachusetts militia (assisted on land by hundreds of marines loaned by the Commodore) had captured Fort George, whose guns commanded Saltonstall's route of attack.

Each commander blamed the other for what happened next. Between them, after initial successes on land and water, the two commanders dithered so long that they were both bottled up by a heavily gunned British rescue squadron from New York. Breaking off the siege, the militia forces on land were successfully moved back aboard their transports and then headed slowly toward hoped for safety up the Penobscot River.
 
The Commodore decided that he could not prevail against the attacking fleet from New York (now supplemented by the three warships that had been defending Fort George).  His plan was to sail as fast as he could upriver and burn his ships to prevent the British from taking them prize. In this he was almost completely successful.

WIth few losses, American forces, both naval and land, were then able to walk and hitch rides back to safety to Boston and elsewhere.

A subsequent review board called by Massachusetts contained no men with naval experience or rank. They never received testimony from Saltonstall but plenty from Lovell.
 
According to Buker, Lovell's testimony was lying but believed. The board placed on blame squarely on Saltonstall, a Connecticut man with little political clout in Massachusetts.

There was apparently a Continental Navy board of inquiry about the Penobscot Expedition, but its proceedings remain shrouded in darkest mystery.
 
The lying "Massachusetts Conspiracy of 1779" succeeded in what George Buker thinks were its goal: to make Congress feel guilty and reimburse the State for its losses. This happened almost 14 years later, in 1793 when Congress paid compensation to Massachusetts valued at $1, 240,000 for the State's losses in the Penobscot Exedition.

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NAUTICAL TRIVIA

What I personally derived as benefit from this rather dry study was increased knowledge of late 18th Century challenges faced by large square-rigged sailing vessels maneuvering in narrow waters.

Buker, a retired navy man himself, makes it abundantly clear that square-rigged fighting vessels were designed to perform best on the high seas. To beat against a wind, they must tack. To advance ten miles in a straight line, they might have to sail 25 miles or more at angles to the wind.

-- Along the Maine coast, the prevailing winds are from the west. Commodore Saltonstall's little armada would have had a wind at his back when he attacked the anchored British ships. But once past them he would be in a "damned hole." To sail back out from under the guns of Fort George he would have had to tack for hours under heavy fire or sluggishly drift out on an ebb tide. 

-- Oars:

"it was not uncommon to find oar ports on frigates, which were placed on the lower deck between the gun ports. Long sweeps, or oars, worked by several men to a sweep moved a vessel in a calm or aided its movement when in restricted waters. When under oars, the vessels were said to sail under a 'white ash wind'" (Ch. 2).

It also took a new skipper a long time to learn his sailing vessel. If the ship, too, was new, it took months of sailing to learn how to trim its sails most effectively and how to position its ballast.

All this sea lore and more has a bearing on judging Commodore Saltonstall. Those landlubber Massachusetts judges who blackened his name until George E. Buker recently set things right,  hadn't a clue what obstacles of shot and shell, maneuver, tides, winds and rocks the "timid" American ships faced on Penobscot Bay.

I found the book's index of limited use. No entries for Congress or oars, for instance. The author worked hard and produced a better than average book. I rate it 3.5 stars, rounded up to 4. Any  friends to whom I might commend THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION need to be very keen on Revolutionary War history or sailing vessels, or both.

-OOO- 

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http://www.patrickkillough.com/books/buker_penobscot.html